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Part I
Synopsis
Abstract
This synopsis presents the arguments and findings of this thesis and discusses its ambition,
contributions, and implications. Two articles of the cumulative dissertation investigate tax
competition among Swiss cantons, and the third analyzes the politics of tax centralization
in the European Union (EU). While the Swiss analysis substantially contributes to the
theoretical and methodological challenges of the research on interdependent policy making,
the implications of the EU article are of relevance for understanding the current institutional
challenges of the EU. All three articles have been published in international peer-reviewed
journals (see Part II of the dissertation for the biographical information on the articles).
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1 Summary
As the world becomes ever more integrated, political scientists have over the last few years gone
beyond the standard comparative approach, which explains policy change in countries with
internal factors and typically assumes that policy decisions in one unit are independent from
the decisions of other units. The shift in political science toward the analysis of interdependence
follows the work of students of American federalism and international relations, which have
studied the diffusion of best practices in federal systems and the international spread of political
phenomena. In contrast to comparativists, scholars of the mentioned sub-fields have investigated
the phenomenon that policy makers are influenced by decisions of other units, instead of treating
interdependence as a theoretical and methodological nuisance (see, e.g., Walker, 1969; Li and
Thompson, 1975).
However, the earlier diffusion literature did not have a substantial impact beyond sub-fields,
as it concentrated on the rather narrow outcome-oriented idea that policies spread. This has
dramatically changed since recent theoretical and methodological advances have shifted the
focus of the literature to the more process-oriented study of the mechanisms of interdependent
policy making. A vibrantly growing literature, populating and connecting various sub-fields of
political science, nowadays analyzes why and how policy makers react to the decisions of other
units. The most important ambition of this dissertation is to contribute to that turn in the
literature by studying tax competition, a quintessential case of interdependence. Specifically, I
analyze tax competition for high income earners among Swiss cantons, which provides, as I will
argue, an ideal-typical empirical setting for investigating the nuances of interdependent policy
making.
The first part of this synopsis presents the cutting edge of the research on interdependence
and explains why I believe that the case of tax competition in Switzerland has great potential
for contributing to that literature. I will also discuss how the three articles of the cumulative
dissertation speak to one another. However, I would like to highlight that the articles are
independent research studies with distinct research questions. Although, in some respects, the
contribution of the whole thesis is greater than the sum of its parts, it is important to note that
each of the three articles presents an original theoretical and empirical analysis. Let me briefly
summarize the arguments and findings of the two Swiss studies:
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Article #1 (Wasserfallen, 2014a): The article on contextual variation in interdependent
policy making argues that cantons situated close to big centers react more strongly to tax
decisions of competitors because they benefit from the public good provision of nearby
centers. The empirical findings support the argument that contextual (in this case geo-
graphic) variation drives interdependence. The main contributions of the study are the
emphasis on the context conditionality of interdependence and the introduction of ad-
vanced hierarchical methods for modeling contextual conditionality.
Article #2 (Gilardi and Wasserfallen, 2014): The second Swiss tax competition article
hypothesizes that cantonal finance ministers create and enforce norms on appropriate
competitive behavior through socialization in regional conferences, which attenuates the
extent to which cantons compete with one another. The empirical findings show that
cantons indeed compete less strongly with competitors that are organized in the same
intergovernmental organization.
The Swiss analysis, which investigates how cantonal policy makers react to tax decisions of
other cantons, makes substantial theoretical and methodological contributions to the literature
on interdependent policy making by elaborating theoretical arguments on the mechanisms of
interdependence and by proposing advanced empirical modeling strategies. The theoretical and
methodological contributions will be discussed in this synopsis in more detail, as well as the
normative and policy implications of the findings.
Normatively, the findings of the Swiss analysis nuance the one-sided positive assessment of
interdependence that some students of American federalism have put forward. Many influential
studies have argued that federal systems are superior because policy makers of sub-national units
introduce policies that have shown to be successful in other units (Walker, 1969; Gray, 1973;
Volden, 2006). While this is a possible outcome of interdependent policy making in federal
states, the comprehensive Swiss analysis shows that interdependence can also be politically
motivated, instead of representing a rational welfare-maximizing learning process. Furthermore,
the thesis contributes to the debate on the argument that politicians’ room to maneuver is
narrow if they face competitive pressure within a highly integrated setting. In the case of tax
competition, some economists have argued that the mobility of tax sources will cause a race-
to-the-bottom in tax rates (Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986). The findings of the socialization
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article, however, highlight that institutions attenuate tax competition dynamics, which is in
line with recent research of political scientists showing that political and institutional factors
constrain competitive interdependence (Basinger and Hallerberg, 2004; Plu¨mper, Troeger and
Winner, 2009).
The third article of this cumulative dissertation uses insights of the Swiss analysis for
the investigation of EU tax politics. While the two Swiss articles contribute to the cutting
edge research on interdependent policy making, the EU article engages with a core question of
integration—namely whether and, if so, the extent to which political integration should comple-
ment the deep economic integration. According to the analysis, economic integration, which is
typically characterized by transfers of supposedly technical tasks to supranational authorities,
increasingly constrains national governance capacities. The basic political dilemma of integra-
tion is that this contraction of the domestic political room to maneuver is, by and large, not
compensated with shifts of political authorities to the European level. Within that broader
context, the third article of this thesis focuses on EU tax centralization.
Article #3 (Wasserfallen, 2014b): The EU study investigates analytically and empirically
the negotiations of tax centralization proposals in intergovernmental conferences. The
main finding of the article is that low-tax countries were more likely to oppose Euro-
pean tax intervention and that the increased heterogeneity after the enlargements further
reduced the already low prospects of tax centralization.
The EU analysis contributes to the understanding of the current institutional challenges and
provides distinct policy recommendations. Based on the premise that political authority shifts
to the European level, including the transfer of taxation powers, should complement the deep
economic integration, the main policy recommendation of the study is to restrict future tax
centralization proposals to the eurozone area, mainly because the benefits of shifting financial
competences has become greater for the eurozone countries, which form a deeply integrated
core group in the EU.
The remainder of the synopsis is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces the literature
and the ambition of the thesis; sections 3 and 4 discuss the contribution of the dissertation;
sections 5 and 6 present the findings as well as the normative and policy implications of the
analysis; and section 7 concludes.
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2 Ambition of the Thesis
In the summer of 2008, I applied for the position as a PhD candidate at Prof. Gilardi’s chair
because I was interested in his internationally renown work on policy diffusion. After the
recruitment, it was clear to me that I wanted to write a dissertation that takes advantage of
the striking progress that the vastly growing policy diffusion research has made in just a few
years. My main ambition was to make a contribution to the theoretical and methodological
challenges of that literature. To get started, I first had to study the state-of-the-art of the
literature, which I did in conjunction with assisting the teaching of a graduate research seminar
on policy diffusion. The teaching of the seminar was a very effective way for me to get familiar
with the various facets of the diffusion literature—and, equally important, the complementarity
between elaborating my own PhD research design and supporting MA students with their work
on diffusion made me experience the unity of research and teaching.
Apart from studying the literature, I had to choose an interesting empirical setting for
my thesis. At the very first meeting we had, Prof. Gilardi suggested that tax competition in
Switzerland would be a promising empirical setting for making a contribution to the diffusion
literature. I think that was an excellent advice, for which I am grateful. In the following, I
discuss the cutting edge of the diffusion literature, the ambitions of my thesis, the rationale for
choosing tax competition in Switzerland as the empirical setting, and how the third part of my
thesis, which analyzes the politics of tax centralization in the EU, is inspired by parts of the
research on Swiss tax competition.
2.1 State-of-the-art: From Diffusion to Interdependence
The conventional approach in comparative research is to model policy choices as a function
of internal conditions, neglecting that political decisions in one country are not necessarily
independent from decisions made in other countries. Contrasting that classical comparative
perspective, students of American federalism have studied the argument that states react to one
another in policy making by paying particular attention to the notion that states are “policy
laboratories” spreading best practices (Walker, 1969; Gray, 1973; Berry and Berry, 1990). Also,
scholars of international relations have a traditional interest in analyzing how political events
and domestic decision making interact with international developments (Li and Thompson,
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1975; Gourevitch, 1978; Huntington, 1991). Yet, due to their specific focuses, both research
traditions had only limited impact beyond their sub-disciplines. Since a few years, however,
the argument that decisions of countries or sub-national units are not independent from one
another has motivated a vastly growing number of studies covering practically all sub-disciplines
of political science. Widely noticed methodological and theoretical contributions from renown
scholars have set the stage for this renewed interest in policy diffusion.
The critical juncture in the literature was that a collection of distinguished scholars shifted
the focus from showing that policy adoptions follow spatial patterns to the analysis of “why”
and “how” politicians make decisions interdependent from one another (Simmons, Dobbin and
Garrett, 2006; Dobbin, Simmons and Garrett, 2007). The broad definition of diffusion, which
Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett provide, is that “policy diffusion occurs when government policy
decisions in a given country are systematically conditioned by prior policy choices made in other
countries” (2006, 787). The core of that definition is to understand diffusion as a process of
interdependent decision making, which can, but does not necessarily need to express itself in
the spread of a specific policy (Gilardi, 2012). Accordingly, the term “interdependent policy
making” captures more precisely the common process-oriented interest of scholars contributing
to the recent turn in the literature than the term “diffusion,” which is directly linked to the
more narrow outcome-oriented idea that a specific policy spreads.
In only a few years, a vast amount of empirical research has overwhelmingly supported the
general argument that interdependence is a critical feature of policy making in various policy
areas (Henisz, Zelner and Guille´n, 2005; Shipan and Volden, 2006; Brooks, 2007; Linos, 2011).
While the “if” question has been answered, the “why” and “how” of interdependence still pose
substantial challenges. Conceptually, scholars tend to agree that the different dynamics of inter-
dependent policy making can be classified into three broad classes of mechanisms: competition,
learning, and emulation (Braun and Gilardi, 2006; Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett, 2006). This
classification usefully defines common conceptual ground, but the mechanisms are very broad.
Accordingly, students of interdependence need to theoretically elaborate on the specific dynam-
ics of interdependence (Volden, Ting and Carpenter, 2008). A major challenge of the literature
remains to theoretically unpack the underlying mechanisms of interdependent policy making.
Apart from defining common conceptual ground, methodological innovation was the other
7
critical element triggering the recent surge of research studying interdependence. Spatial anal-
ysis has become the standard method applied in the literature. Empirical models using that
approach include as the main explanatory variable a so-called spatial lag, which is, formally
expressed, the product of a row-standardized connectivity matrix, W, and the dependent vari-
able, y. Simply put, a spatial lag is the weighted average of the dependent variable in other
units, whereas the connectivity matrix, W, specifies the weights. Traditional spatial models have
coded neighborhood as connectivities. In that case, the spatial lag for a specific unit is the sum
of the dependent variable of its neighbors, divided by the number of neighbors. The estimates
of the spatial lags reveal whether and, if so, the extent to which, policy makers react to policy
changes in other units.1 In the case of the neighborhood operationalization, the estimates show
the responsiveness to neighbors’ policy choices.
The key connection between the theoretical turn to the study of mechanisms and the method-
ological advances in spatial analysis revolves around the specification of the connectivity matrix,
W, which has to be justified theoretically. Not long ago, scholars typically reported “evidence
of diffusion and impute[d] that their favored mechanism is at work” (Dobbin, Simmons and
Garrett, 2007, 463). The standard procedure was to model neighborhood as connectivities and
to interpret the empirical results as evidence of learning, competition, or some other form of
interdependence. Recent studies have gone beyond this rather crude approach by using various
connectivities, such as traffic data, network measures, and economic indicators (Simmons and
Elkins, 2004; Zhukov and Stewart, 2013; Cao and Prakash, 2012; Lloyd, Simmons and Stewart,
2012). Although scholars nowadays compute connectivities that are more convincing opera-
tionalization of the mechanisms they are interested in, there is still some concern that spatial
models are based on over-simplified assumptions (Ward and Grundig, 2011).
In sum, theoretical and methodological advances have jump-started a vastly growing liter-
ature on interdependent policy making. However, despite substantial improvements, the main
challenge, which is the theoretical and empirical unpacking of how and why policy makers are
influenced by decision in other countries or subnational units, has not changed to date. Within
that context of academic progress and unsolved puzzles, the main ambition of my research is
to advance our knowledge of interdependent policy making. More specifically, in the research
1Several methodological issues, from endogeneity concerns to the selection of the appropriate estimation
techniques, complicate spatial analysis (Franzese and Hays, 2007, 2008; Ward and Gleditsch, 2008).
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design, which I presented at the CIS PhD colloquium in spring 2009, I outlined two main am-
bitions. First, I intended to theoretically elaborate distinct arguments on interdependence that
are relevant beyond the studied case. Second, based on the premise that interdependent deci-
sion making is not univocal, but can take different forms, I attempted to analyze multiple forms
of interdependence within one policy area. To achieve these goals, I selected tax competition
in Switzerland as the empirical setting. In the following, I discuss the rationale of that case
selection.
2.2 Why Study Swiss Tax Competition?
Tax policy has been a popular area for diffusion scholars all along because the interdependent
nature of tax policy making is straightforward (Hays, 2003; Basinger and Hallerberg, 2004;
Swank, 2006). Although scholars have, quite understandably, focused on competition, more
recent research has pointed to learning as a critical mechanism of interdependence. Jensen
and Lindsta¨dt (2012), for example, argue that corporate tax-cuts by left governments provide
heuristic information about the success of such reform, which increases the likelihood that gov-
ernments cut corporate tax rates. Baturo and Gray (2009) also develop a learning explanation,
claiming that policy makers in central Europe introduced flat taxe rates after they observed
that this reform attracted foreign direct investment in other countries. The extension to learn-
ing shows that tax policy making, as a quintessential case of interdependence, is an interesting
policy area for analyzing multiple forms of interdependent policy making beyond competition.
But why shift from the international to the sub-national level? One critical motivation was
that the sub-national tax competition literature offers interesting analytical insights for elabo-
rating on the mechanisms of interdependent policy making. Economists have a long record in
the study of fiscal federalism. The theoretical debates of the literature are based on arguments,
which have been part of abstract reflections ever since political philosophers, such as Rousseau
or Montesquieu, pointed to the advantages of federal systems. Almost 50 years ago, Tiebout
(1956) introduced the influential idea that an efficient allocation of public goods can be achieved
when people are able to “vote with their feet” because policy makers in small and relatively
homogenous jurisdictions are more responsive to the preferences of the electorate. Oates (1972,
2005) also argued that local public good provision is more efficient than centralized governance.2
2For a critical overview on the fiscal federalism contributions of economists, see Rodden (2006).
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Challenging the welfare-enhancing Tiebout argument, several theoretical studies have argued
that tax competition on the sub-national level is associated with a race-to-the-bottom in tax
rates, causing under-provision of public goods (Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986; Wilson, 1986;
Sinn, 2004). The asymmetric tax competition literature extends the work on the detrimental
effects of tax competition by analyzing how small units react differently in tax competition
than larger units (Wilson, 1991; Bucovetsky, 1991; Dehejia and Genschel, 1999). Further models
identify spillovers as drives of interdependent decision making. Spillover models show that policy
makers’ tax and spending decisions are influenced by the extent to which they benefit from the
public goods provision of nearby jurisdictions (Case, Rosen and Hines, 1993; Brueckner, 2003).
Thus, the economics literature on sub-national tax competition points to various interesting
theoretical aspects of competitive interdependence.
However, while the theoretical fiscal federalism literature is vast, empirical research lags far-
behind. Many theoretical predictions have not been empirically tested at all, and the studies
that exist, typically test whether policy makers react to tax changes of their neighbors. Such
research exists for the US states (Case, 1993; Deskins and Hill, 2010), local governments in the
areas of Boston, Chicago or Belgium (Brueckner and Saavedra, 2001; Hendrick, Wu and Jacob,
2007; Heyndels and Vuchelen, 1998), Canadian provinces (Esteller-More´ and Sole´-Olle´, 2002),
French regions (Reulier and Rocaboy, 2009), or Swiss cantons (Feld and Reulier, 2009). The
shortcoming of these empirical studies is that researchers impute, just like earlier diffusion schol-
ars did, that the detected spatial interdependence, which they have tested with neighborhood
connectivities, are a consequence of their favored theoretical model.
In sum, the complementary contributions of the diffusion and fiscal federalism literature,
which set the stage for the first part of my dissertation, can be summarized as follows: while
the vast formal work of the fiscal federalism literature offers analytical insights, which are useful
to theoretically elaborate on the mechanisms of interdependent policy making, the advances of
the diffusion literature, particularly the turn toward more accurate operationalizations of the
mechanisms beyond neighborhood connectivities (Simmons and Elkins, 2004; Beck, Gleditsch
and Beardsley, 2006), provide conceptual landmarks for improving the empirical investigation
of tax competition dynamics.
But why Switzerland? I would argue that Switzerland, as one of the most fiscally de-
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centralized countries in the world (OECD, 2011), provides a perfect empirical case to study
sub-national tax interdependence, mainly because of specific features of the Swiss case. In
Switzerland, cantonal tax autonomy has deep historical roots and is constitutionally protected
(Gilardi, Ku¨bler and Wasserfallen, 2013). Particularly income taxation is highly decentralized,
and there is a large variation in income tax systems among the 26 cantons. The tax rate dif-
ferences are substantial: in some cases, the tax due of high income earners drops to less than
half after a change of residence. Moving to another canton is not only financially attractive,
but due to the small size of the country also a feasible option.3 Within that setting, cantonal
decision makers closely monitor the tax policies of other cantons, and the dynamics as well as
the consequences of cantonal tax competition are recurrent topics in Swiss politics, which makes
the Swiss case almost resemble a natural experiment for tax interdependence. Finally, various
sources make it possible to collect exceptionally fine-grained data on the dependent variable
(income tax rates) and the main explanatory variables (spatial lags).
The two Swiss studies of the dissertation illustrate that interdependence is not necessarily
univocal, but can take different forms. While the first article shows that the quite intense tax
competition for high income earners is driven by asymmetric competition, the second article
argues that socialization effects in inter-cantonal networks attenuate tax competition dynamics.
As will be discussed in more detail in sections 3 and 4, both analyses contribute theoretically
and methodologically to the current challenges of the diffusion literature, which was the main
ambition I intended to accomplish with my thesis.
2.3 Going Beyond the Swiss Case
An additional ambition of my dissertation was to use some of the insights of the Swiss analysis
for studying relevant questions of international tax competition and cooperation. I already iden-
tified in the research design presented at the CIS PhD colloquium in spring 2009 the debates on
tax harmonization in the EU as a potentially interesting case but, at that stage of the research,
I deliberately left open which insights of the Swiss analysis should inform the investigation of
European tax centralization. After I carried out the bulk of the Swiss research, I started my
research stay at Harvard’s Weatherhead Center for International Affairs in September 2011,
during which I worked on the EU tax centralization research. The year was dominated by
3Switzerland can be crossed in less than 4 hours.
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the euro crisis, and the challenges of the EU were subject of many interesting roundtables and
seminars at Harvard.
Inspired by that, I wrote an analysis on what I believe to be the defining feature of integra-
tion over the last decades—namely that economic and political integration have drifted apart
with the creation of the single market and the monetary union. An important question within
that broader context is why the heads of state could not agree on further political integration
steps to complement the deep economic integration. A critical element of political integration is
the construction of fiscal governance capacities, including the establishment of a European tax
authority. In each intergovernmental conference since Maastricht, the heads of state discussed
tax centralization proposals going in that direction. The EU article of this cumulative disser-
tation explains theoretically and empirically which member states were more likely to oppose
such proposals and, thus, adds to our understanding of why political integration failed in an
important area.
The objective to use insights from the Swiss study for research on EU tax centralization has
been fulfilled in the sense that both analyses share the analytical argument of asymmetric payoff
structures. The theoretical overlap is that I investigate asymmetric effects of tax competition
dynamics in the Swiss case, and I use a similar framework to show that the europeanization of tax
authority is associated with asymmetric costs and benefits for the member states. Specifically,
the EU study argues that the cost-benefit variation of asymmetric tax competition in the single
market explains the variation in support for European tax intervention. To some extent at
least, the asymmetric competitive dynamic in the full-fledged federal system of Switzerland
is comparable to the cleavage dividing the member states of the EU in the discussions on
fiscal federal reforms. Tax competition dynamics in Switzerland and EU tax harmonization
negotiations are dominated by asymmetric material interests.
3 Theoretical Contribution
Both Swiss analyses contribute to the diffusion literature by developing distinct arguments on
the mechanisms of interdependence. The first article studies the context conditionality and
asymmetric dimension of competition and the second, which I co-author with Fabrizio Gilardi,
elaborates on the effects of socialization in intergovernmental organizations.
12
3.1 Article #1: Contextual Variation in Interdependent Policy Making
The most important theoretical contribution of the article on contextual variation in interde-
pendent policy making to the diffusion literature is the focus on the context conditionality of
interdependence (Cao and Prakash, 2012; Neumayer and Plu¨mper, 2012). Standard diffusion
studies assume that interdependence is uniform, which is often an unrealistic assumption, rais-
ing legitimate concerns that the dynamics specified in spatial models are over-simplified (Ward
and Grundig, 2011). In any study on interdependent decision making, there are potential in-
stitutional, political, or geographic factors that might shape the extent to which policy makers
are responsive to the choices made in other units. Accordingly, I argue that elaborating on
the context conditionality of interdependent decision making is an effective strategy for a more
accurate unpacking of the why and how of diffusion.
For the case of tax competition in Switzerland, the theoretical literature on asymmetric tax
competition provides an account for cantonal heterogeneity in responsiveness. Most theoretical
asymmetric tax competition models assume that size is the critical factor explaining variation in
responsiveness (Bucovetsky, 1991; Wilson, 1991; Dehejia and Genschel, 1999). The basic argu-
ment of these models is that small units have smaller tax bases than larger units, which means
that they need fewer additional taxable resources to compensate the revenue losses associated
with tax cuts. Put differently, where mobile taxpayers reside is relatively more important for
small units. The predictions of these models are as follows: the smaller a jurisdiction, the lower
its tax level, and the more responsive will its government be to the tax changes of competitors.
The article on contextual variation of interdependence formulates a similar asymmetric tax
competition hypothesis, based, however, on spillover arguments, which are the underlying driver
in many theoretical tax competition models of the fiscal federalism literature (Wilson, 1999;
Brueckner, 2003). One theoretical argument of spillover models is that units nearby centers with
a comprehensive infrastructure benefit from positive externalities of the public good provision
in the centers, and that the beneficial spillover from centers is important for attracting mobile
tax payers. As a consequence, units benefiting from spillover are, like small units, in a relatively
better position to attract mobile tax payers, which leads to similar predictions as the ones
discussed before: the more a jurisdiction benefits from spillover, the lower its tax level, and the
more responsive will its government be to the tax changes of competitors.
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In sum, the argument put forward in this article provides a distinct theoretical account of
interdependence using the analytical insights of tax competition models. The study takes advan-
tage of the theoretical work of scholars interested in fiscal federalism for making a contribution
to the current main ambition of the diffusion literature, which is to disentangle the mechanisms
of interdependence. Of general relevance for the diffusion literature is furthermore the article’s
point of departure that the extent to which governments react to decisions of other units varies
according to contextual factors. While in the article of this dissertation, the spillover argument
explains variation in responsiveness, institutional, political, or geographic context conditional-
ity is of relevance for other studies too. Generally speaking, the focus on heterogeneity is a
promising strategy for disentangling the underlying mechanisms of interdependence.
3.2 Article #2: How Socialization Attenuates Tax Competition
The socialization article analyzes the effects of joint membership in intergovernmental confer-
ences, arguing that, through socialization, personal interaction in regional conferences of finance
ministers attenuates tax competition dynamics. The theoretical argument of this study builds
on the international relations literature, which has shown that intergovernmental organizations
are important venues for socialization. This literature follows the tradition of sociologists who
have argued that decision makers are not only driven by rational motives, but that interaction
among individuals in structured networks can result in common understandings and definitions
of problems (Granovetter, 1985; Davis and Greve, 1997; Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001; Dobbin,
Simmons and Garrett, 2007).
Several studies covering various policy areas have shown that countries joining the same
intergovernmental networks converge on interests and adopt similar policies (Bearce and Bon-
danella, 2007; Bach and Newman, 2010; Greenhill, 2010; Cao, 2009, 2010). However, it is
difficult to distinguish whether these correlations are the result of socialization in networks or
rather an artifact of self-selection into the networks. The advantage of our research is that
the participation in the regional intergovernmental conferences is exogenous to tax competi-
tion interests because the compositions of the regional conferences have historical origins, are
geographically motivated, and are constant across policy areas. This research design advan-
tage, however, does not solve the general challenge of elaborating a clear understanding of how
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socialization in networks translates into policy making.
Our definition of socialization is based on the argument that discussions in intergovern-
mental organizations create specific norms, which are expectations about appropriate behav-
ior, and that social interaction within the intergovernmental organizations potentially induce
norm-conforming behavior (Coleman, 1990; Young, 1996; Johnston, 2001; Checkel, 2005). With
qualitative research, we analyzed the discussions and internal dynamics in inter-cantonal con-
ferences. Several interviews with officials revealed that tax competition is a recurrent topic
in regional conferences, and that some annoyance with aggressive tax practices is internally
but not publicly expressed. On the basis of qualitative insights and the theoretical literature
on norm creation and norm-conforming behavior, we hypothesize that the regular and intense
exchange in the inter-cantonal conferences, in which also discussions on the appropriate level
of competition are held, limits the extent of competitive interaction among the cantons joining
the same regional conferences. It is important to note that we do not argue that socialization
in inter-cantonal conferences would prevent competition altogether, but that it constrains the
intensity of competition.
A contribution of our analysis to the socialization literature is that we study the argument
that joint membership in intergovernmental organizations alters policy decisions in a policy
area where significant financial interests are at stake, which is a harder test than the study
of ideational policies, such as human rights (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001; Greenhill, 2010).
Finally, I would like to stress that this article goes explicitly beyond competition by showing
that tax interdependence is not univocal, but that it can take multiple forms.
4 Methodological Contribution
The Swiss analyses use travel data and commuting patterns to model competitive tax interaction
among cantons. I argue that these fine-grained connectivity measures accurately approximate
the underlying micro-mechanism driving tax competition—namely that policy makers are re-
sponsive to the tax decisions of cantons, to which high-income earners might move if the tax
rates become relatively more attractive there. Apart from the nuanced operationalization of
competitive tax interaction, I introduce in both articles on Swiss tax competition method-
ological innovations that are relevant for the diffusion literature. The empirical strategy put
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forward in the socialization article allows researchers to investigate whether policy makers react
more or less strongly to different configurations of other units, and the model specification in
the contextual variation study is designed for the empirical analysis of contextual variation in
responsiveness.
In the socialization article, we combine multiple connectivity data for evaluating how two
mechanisms (socialization and competition) interact with one another. Concretely, we hy-
pothesize that finance ministers react more strongly to tax changes of competitors, which are
organized in other regional conferences, as compared to the competitors with which finance
ministers extensively interact. To test that hypothesis, we create on the basis of the competi-
tion measure two additional connectivity matrices, which contrast competitors that belong to
the same regional conference with those that do not. This comparative procedure combines
multiple connectivities and tests whether joint participation in the same regional conferences
alters competitive interaction among cantons. The developed empirical strategy analyzes, by
construction, multiple forms of interdependence and provides some guidance for researchers who
want to investigate whether policy makers react differently to specific configurations of other
units.
The contextual variation article, in contrast, proposes an innovative empirical strategy for
the case that students of interdependence theorize that specific units are more responsive than
others because of structural factors. The motivating argument here is not that units react
more or less strongly to different configurations of other units, but that the policy makers of
specific units are more responsive to policy decisions made in other units. Conceptually, the
empirical strategy put forward challenges the conventional approach of most diffusion studies,
which assume that interdependence is uniform among the units of analysis. A handful of recent
articles has analyzed heterogeneity in responsiveness (Basinger and Hallerberg, 2004; Cao and
Prakash, 2012). The standard method applied in these studies is to interact the spatial lag with
a variable that is supposed to mediate interdependent policy making. The time-series cross-
section models include unit fixed effects. Researchers using this modeling strategy are restricted
to the analysis of variation over time, given that the fixed effects absorb level-heterogeneity
across units. Accordingly, this specification is reasonable when researchers argue theoretically
that change over time in a specific variable conditions the extent to which governments are
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responsive to decisions in other units.
I would argue, though, that in many cases contextual factors mediate the extent to which
policy makers’ react to decisions made in other units. Typical contextual variables that influence
the responsiveness of policy makers are structural determinants, such as institutional, political,
and geographic variables. In the case of mediation through structural variables, the analysis
of contextual variation (across the units) has to be combined with the analysis of dynamic
interdependence (modeled with spatial lags). We thus need a specification that models both
time-invariant contextual variation and dynamic interdependence, which is not possible with the
standard time-series cross-section approach including fixed effects. As alternative, I introduce
in the contextual variation article hierarchical time-series cross-section models, which allow the
testing of context conditional interdependence (Western, 1998; Zorn, 2001; Bartels, 2011).
The generic linear multilevel regression model I propose consists of two levels, whereas the
spatial lag, as a dynamic variable, is modeled on Level-1 and the contextual factor on Level-2.
The multilevel setup is then extended to allow the estimates of the spatial lag to vary across
units as a function of the contextual variable. Accordingly, the estimates of the varying spatial
lag slope show whether policy makers’ responsiveness is contingent on the contextual variable.
In the article of this dissertation, the positive externalities from centers are the contextual factor
mediating competitive interaction, following the hypothesis that cantons situated close to big
centers have a structural comparative advantage in tax competition because they benefit from
spillover. Yet the same modeling approach can be used to investigate any contextual condi-
tionality of interdependence that is based on structural institutional, political, or geographic
arguments.
5 Findings and Implications of the Swiss Analysis
Apart from the theoretical and methodological contributions, the normative and policy impli-
cations of the thesis’ findings deserve some attention too. Consistent with previous research
(Feld and Kirchga¨ssner, 2001; Feld and Reulier, 2009), the empirical findings of my dissertation
corroborate that competition is the critical element of cantonal tax decision making. Going
beyond that empirical observation, the two Swiss articles provide a nuanced analysis of the
drivers and constraints of inter-cantonal tax competition dynamics. The results of the con-
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textual variation study show that cantons benefiting from spillover of nearby centers tax high
income earners at substantially lower levels, and that they react more strongly to tax decisions
of competitors. The latter finding essentially suggests that cantons with a comparative advan-
tage in tax competition accelerate competitive dynamics. In other words, cantons initiate and
reinforce interdependence, depending on how much they benefit from the public good provision
of nearby centers.
While the article on contextual variation focuses on asymmetric dynamics, the socialization
study adds to the literature on institutional and political constraints of tax competition. Recent
political science research has documented that the role of veto players, electoral and labor
market institutions, fiscal constraints, and equity norms limit downward pressures on tax rates
(Hays, 2003; Basinger and Hallerberg, 2004; Plu¨mper, Troeger and Winner, 2009). Our findings
indicate that norm creation and enforcement in intergovernmental organizations also limit tax
competition. The empirical results of the socialization article show that cantons compete less
strongly if finance ministers interact in regional conferences because participation and exchange
in intergovernmental organizations attenuate tax competition dynamics.
5.1 Policy Implications
The main institutional instrument in Switzerland for regulating inter-cantonal tax competition
is a sophisticated fiscal equalization system, which has recently been completely changed as part
of a broad federal reform. The federal reform was implemented in 2008, and because of its com-
prehensiveness is also called “the reform of the century” (Braun, 2009). The fiscal equalization
system adjusts, through substantial inter-cantonal transfer payments, tax and fiscal disparities.
Essentially, the cantons that can levy large tax revenues from corporations and high income
earners support, according to a pre-specified estimation procedure, recipient cantons with less
favorable socio-economic structures (Daﬄon, 2004). In the Swiss case, the most effective po-
litical instrument for accelerating or alleviating inter-cantonal tax competition is to increase
or decrease the overall amount of equalization payments, which is technically straightforwardly
implemented but, of course, depends on the power balance in the political arena.
Another important part of the vast federal reform is the emphasis on inter-cantonal and
regional collaboration. New measures, including a federal enforcement mechanism, have been
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introduced for promoting inter-cantonal cooperation and agreements, which should, among
others, regulate the shared financing of public goods with regional importance. This aspect
of the reform is supposed to limit free-riding by addressing the problem that cantons benefit
from services of centers without paying for them. However, criticism and concerns dominated
the discussion about federal enforcement mechanisms. It was argued that any sort of federal
enforcement would interfere with cantonal sovereignty, and that inter-cantonal arrangements of
public goods provision were lacking sufficient democratic legitimacy (Steinlin, 2011). Given the
strong resistance, it comes as no surprise that the eventual enforcement mechanisms are weak.
Recent examples in health care, education, and culture suggest that the new instruments fall
short in satisfying the (already low) expectations (Fu¨glister and Wasserfallen, 2014).
Taking position against the voices criticizing measures promoting inter-cantonal coopera-
tion, the results of my thesis strongly support the introduction of effective mechanisms that
facilitate inter-cantonal cooperation. The findings of the contextual variation article provide
strong analytical and empirical grounds for inter-cantonal arrangements regulating the joint
financing of public goods provision with regional impact; and the socialization study shows that
the interaction and exchange of information among cantonal policy makers affects policy mak-
ing. Accordingly, I recommend, based on the dissertation’s findings, to revise this part of the
federal reform and to design a framework that further stimulates inter-cantonal and regional col-
laboration. An effective revised framework should include stronger federal enforcement powers
and the use of federal financial incentives.
5.2 Normative Implications
Apart from the policy implications, the detailed analysis of interdependence in cantonal decision
making points to important normative questions of the diffusion literature. As outlined before,
diffusion researchers think about why and how policy makers react to the decisions made in other
units. The theorizing of that question is then followed by an empirical test of interdependence.
What is typically missing in diffusion studies, however, (and the articles of this thesis are not
necessarily exceptions in that regard), is a normative discussion of the analyzed interdependent
policy making, and the empirical testing of the assumptions driving interdependence.
A full-fledged analysis of interdependent policy making, including the investigation of as-
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sumptions, requires a substantial collective research effort. The vast research on Swiss tax
competition is at a point where we have a quite comprehensive understanding of interdepen-
dence, allowing to reflect on normative questions. Let us start with the core assumption of
tax competition models, that the taxable income for which policy makers compete is at least
partially mobile. It is uncontroversial to argue that Swiss policy makers take that assumption
for granted, as they expect high income earners to change residence because of cantonal tax
reforms. Accordingly, the challenge for students of interdependence is to model which cantons
are, in the view of policy makers, the relevant competitors. All that matters is the perception
of policy makers, given that models of interdependence eventually seek to explain policy mak-
ing. I have argued that my thesis provides accurate solutions in that regard. However, what
remains an open question is the extent to which the perception of policy makers is actually
based on empirical evidence. This question is critical because the answer to it tells us whether
tax competition is driven by the mobility of tax sources, or whether interdependence is rather
politically constructed.
On the international level, tax competition studies assume that corporate tax levels are
important for attracting business activity (Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano, 2008). Some
studies provide empirical evidence for the mobility assumption (Hines, 1999), but more recent
research finds no correlation between corporate tax rates and flows of foreign direct investment
(Jensen, 2012). In the Swiss case, economists argue, based on the observation that the share of
high income earners is greater in cantons with lower tax rates, that citizens choose their place of
residence depending on tax rates (Kirchga¨ssner and Pommerehne, 1996; Feld and Kirchga¨ssner,
2001).4 However, the causal interpretation of that correlation is problematic because of the
endogeneity problem that lower tax rates for high income earners can be both the cause and
effect of high shares of wealthy residents (Schmidheiny, 2005). Bru¨lhart and Parchet (2014)
provide the most comprehensive analysis of the mobility assumption for the Swiss case by
investigating whether wealthy elderly individuals change residence as a reaction to cantonal
bequest tax reforms. They find that tax competition was the most prominent argument in
legislative debates for the reduction of bequest tax rates, but wealthy elderly individuals did
not systematically change residence because of such reforms. Consequently, they conclude that
inter-cantonal tax competition is “alleged” not “real.”
4More recent studies find no evidence for tax-induced migration (Liebig and Sousa-Poza, 2006).
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The reported results suggest that Swiss tax competition is largely based on the constructed
perception of policy makers, not necessarily on real pressures stemming from tax base mobility.
The socialization article, which shows that joint membership in regional conferences mitigate
tax competition dynamics, supports the view that interdependence is shaped by the political dis-
course and institutions. Thus, while competition is an important component of an ideologically
loaded debate, the extent to which cantons actually are pressured by tax cuts of competitors is
unclear and rarely debated. Now, if interdependence dominates policy making, as it is the case
in Switzerland, because politicians take the drivers of interdependence for granted, instead of
reflecting on their empirical validity, the normative judgement of interdependent policy making
is not positive. Such a critical normative assessment of interdependence contrasts with the pos-
itive view of the American federalism literature, which argues that federal systems are superior
because sub-national units serve as policy laboratories, inventing new policies and promoting
best practices. Whether interdependence is good or bad depends on the specific processes.
6 Findings and Implications of the EU Analysis
The findings of the EU study contribute to the debate on the defining normative question of
whether European integration should be foremost a political or an economic project. This
question overshadows discussions on the nature, shortcomings, and challenges of the EU. For
example, the conflicting perspectives in the academic literature on the democratic deficit reflect
profound disagreement about this fundamental question of integration. While Follesdal and
Hix (2006, 534) identify democratic legitimacy as a flaw of the current institutional framework
because “a democratic polity requires contestation for political leadership and argument over
the direction of the policy agenda[,]” which is, by and large, absent in the case of the EU; Majone
(1998) and Moravcsik (2002) take the opposite view, arguing that such democratic standards
would not apply to the EU because its mandate is restricted to technical and economic functions
of low electoral salience.
The EU tax centralization article reflects on specific aspects of this general debate by showing
that economic integration and political integration have drifted apart over the last two decades.
This study argues that the successful economic integration of the single market and the monetary
union increasingly constrain the national room to maneuver in taxation, a core state function
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of high electoral salience, which is in line with the contributions of Genschel and Jachtenfuchs
(2013) and Scharpf (1994, 2009, 2011). The basic problem is that the deep economic integration
is undermining national taxing powers and the national control over public revenue, while, at
the same time, the heads of state are reluctant to transfer political authorities to the EU
to compensate for the contraction of member states’ governance capacities. The most recent
example of that general dilemma is that national governments of the eurozone members have
lost, after delegating monetary policy to the supranational level, macroeconomic options, which
have not (yet) been compensated with European economic and fiscal competences.
The broader point is that Majone (1996) and Moravcsik (1998) are right in emphasizing
that the EU does not have a mandate in politically salient issue areas, such as redistribution
and taxation; however, the lack of such European authorities does not mean that national
legislators and governments could keep national autonomy and sovereignty in those areas. In
fact, the deep economic integration imposes substantial constrains on the room to maneuver
of democratically accountable national governments. Based on that insight, I argue that the
model of deep economic integration without political integration on the European level does
not represent a “logical endpoint” of integration (Moravcsik, 2001, 163)—if anything, it is an
unsustainable institutional framework. To contribute to that broader debate, the EU article of
my dissertation analyzes why the heads of state could not agree on political integration steps
for compensating the contraction of national governance capacities. I investigate that general
question for the case of tax centralization.
Using a political economy framework on the costs and benefits of tax centralization for
member states, the analysis of the Maastricht, Nice, and Lisbon intergovernmental conferences
suggests that basic cost-benefit calculations were the critical drivers of tax centralization poli-
tics. Specifically, the empirical findings show that low-tax countries were more likely to oppose
European tax intervention, and that the increased tax heterogeneity after the accession of the
central and eastern European countries made tax centralization among the EU-27 even more
unlikely than it was before the enlargements. The EU article, thus, explains analytically and
empirically why further shifts of tax authority to the European level failed, and it discusses the
implications of the monetary union and the enlargements for the politics of tax centralization.
The general lesson of the EU analysis is that the benefits of centralizing political authority
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outweigh the costs only if there is some degree of homogeneity among the countries that pool
authority. While the accession of the central and eastern European countries has led to increased
heterogeneity among the EU-27, the introduction of the euro resulted in the creation of a
deeply integrated core group of member states, which increasingly divides the eurozone from
the non-eurozone countries. The findings of the analysis suggest that it becomes more and
more attractive for the eurozone countries to pool fiscal, tax, and economic competences among
themselves. The centralization of such authorities within the eurozone area is also politically
more feasible, given that the heterogeneity among the eurozone countries is significantly lower
(compared to the heterogeneity among the EU-27). The policy recommendation of the EU
article, thus, is to build political institutions and decision making mechanisms for the members
of the monetary union and to concentrate the pooling of tax and economic political authorities
to the eurozone area.
7 Conclusion
This synopsis discussed the ambition, findings, methodological and theoretical contributions,
as well as the policy and normative implications of my cumulative dissertation. The two Swiss
articles of the thesis analyze a quintessential case of interdependent policy making by studying
tax competition among Swiss cantons, and the third article investigates the politics of EU tax
centralization.
The main ambition of my thesis, accomplished with the two Swiss articles, was to con-
tribute to the vastly growing literature on interdependent policy making. The first Swiss study
shows that cantons benefiting from the spillover of nearby centers react more strongly to the
tax decisions of competitors. The article argues that the study of contextual conditionality
is a promising strategy for disentangling the mechanisms of diffusion. The second Swiss arti-
cle hypothesizes that norm creation and norm-conforming behavior, induced by socialization
in intergovernmental organizations, affect competitive dynamics. The analysis contributes to
the diffusion literature by exploring in-depth the socialization mechanism. Apart from the
theoretical contributions, the normative assessment of the research on Swiss tax competition
contrasts with the positive view of the American federalism literature, which argues that policy
makers in sub-national units rationally monitor policies in other states and introduce them,
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if they have been successful elsewhere. In the case of Swiss tax competition, interdependent
decision making is largely driven by the constructed perceptions of policy makers, not a rational
welfare-maximizing updating process.
The third study of the cumulative thesis investigates the negotiations of EU tax centraliza-
tion proposals in intergovernmental conferences. Similar to the Swiss tax competition research,
the theoretical framework of the analysis is based on asymmetric payoff structures. The most
important contribution of this study is its relevance for the current discussion on the institu-
tional challenges of the EU. The article argues that the deep economic integration increasingly
constrains fiscal and tax policy making at the national level, and that the member states could
not agree on political integration steps for compensating this contraction of national governance
capacities. The findings of the analysis suggest that the monetary union made the pooling of
fiscal and tax authority among the members of the eurozone more beneficial and, thus, recom-
mends to focus on political integration within the eurozone area.
In sum, two articles of my cumulative dissertation contribute theoretically and method-
ologically to the diffusion literature, the findings of the Swiss analyses add to the political tax
competition debate in Switzerland, and the EU article provides insights for the discussions on
the institutional challenges of European integration.
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